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I. INTRODUCTION
Applying basic economic analysis to the corporate form is useful for a variety
of reasons. Not least among these reasons is that it provides a remarkably clear lens
through which the problems of corporate law and corporate governance can be
viewed with clarity and precision, In particular, economic analysis teaches that the
line of demarcation between transactions that take place within firms on the one
hand and transactions which take place across markets on the other hand is blurry
at the best of times, and completely indistinct at other times.
The starting point for any analysis of the impact of economic thought on the
problems of corporate law is Ronald Coase's master-work, The Nature of the Firm.,
In this article, the question of how to distinguish between markets and firms was
* J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell University. A.B. Harvard College, 1977; J.D. Yale
Law School, 1982.
1. 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937).
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first presented. Much important work has been done since Coase's piece first
appeared in 1937. Now it seems clear that the role of corporate law is to reduce the
costs of entering into business relationships, and the primary way in which this is
done is by crafting standard-form contracts which greatly reduce the costs of
organizing a business venture to the various parties, shareholders, entrepreneurs,
and managers. It would be incalculably costly for the various parties to such a long-
term relationship to specify all of the terms and conditions of that relationship in a
single agreement, because future conditions are complex and uncertain. Because
contracts are costly to write and negotiate, societies that wish to encourage capital
formation, efficient capital allocation, and savings and investment will devise corpo-
ration codes which make standard-form, boilerplate language available for adoption
by management and shareholders.
By providing the default language for shareholders who do not find it cost-
effective to provide customized language for themselves, the law can play a powerful
and salutary role. Corporate law plays a particularly large role in helping partici-
pants in the corporate enterprise deal with events that they do not believe are likely
to happen. When there is a very low probability of a future contingency taking
place, the costs of specifying how the parties should respond to that contingency
generally will outweigh the benefits of describing the terms:
Firms that wish to avail themselves of the option can thereby lower
transaction costs by not drafting and negotiating specific provisions in
their contracts. But not all firms will find the legal prescription that is
chosen appropriate. The ability of firms to contract around costly legal
rules when lower-cost private alternatives are available must be a feature
of any efficient standard-form contract.'
II. MANDATORY V. ENABLING RULES
Scholars who take the traditional, non-economic approach to corporate law and
corporate governance reject the idea that corporate law rules should be enabling.
These scholars assert that corporate law rules should provide a set of commands and
controls which regulate the internal corporate governance of corporations and
cannot be altered or deviated from by the parties, even if the parties themselves
consent to such alterations or deviations.
At the outset, it should be emphasized that nobody argues that all corporate
law rules should be mandatory. Even the most ardent proponents of the position that
corporate law rules should be mandatory realize market forces and mutual agree-
ment play important roles in determining the rules governing corporate behavior.8
2. David D. Haddock et al., Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. L.
REV. 701, 736 (1987).
3. Professor Melvin Eisenberg, perhaps the leading proponent of the view that corporate law should
be mandatory rather than enabling, freely admits that the rules which govern corporations are deter-
mined by contracts and other agreements as well as market forces, "unilateral action of corporate organs
or officials," and law. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461,
1461 (1989).
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Perhaps the most often invoked argument in favor of mandatory legal rules
reflects a concern for the same agency cost problems that have interested econo-
mists. But it is in no way obvious that concern that shareholders' interests will
diverge from managers' interests automatically translates into an endorsement of
mandatory rules of corporate law which the parties cannot customize for their own
use if they choose.
The issue is whether the benefits of a set of mandatory corporate law
rules-such as the benefits that come in the form of reduced agency costs-are
greater than the costs associated with those rules. All of the available evidence indi-
cates that mandatory rules do not provide significant benefits to shareholders and
that any identifiable benefits associated with such rules are greatly outweighed by
the costs.4
III. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF MANDATORY RULES
A. Investor Protection
As noted above, the principal argument in favor of mandatory rules concerns
agency costs: after making their initial investments, shareholders are unable to
control managers from taking unilateral actions that are contrary to shareholders'
interests. Thus, it is argued, mandatory rules are needed to protect shareholders'
interests. Professor Jeff Gordon has pointed out that the investor protection argu-
ment relies on two assumptions. The first assumption is that uninformed and
unsophisticated shareholders "will be systematically victimized by unexpected, one-
sided charter terms."' 5 The second critical assumption is that "charter terms, unlike
other information that may affect investors' expected returns, are not priced, so that
even informed investors may be victimized."
The reason the investor protection argument depends on these assumptions is
that if either of these assumptions turns out to be false, then markets will correctly
price new, non-mandatory variations on corporate law that are contained in firms'
charter provisions. Therefore, the initial sellers of securities, not the purchasers, will
bear the costs of any sub-optimal enabling legal rules. These costs will come in the
form of higher capital costs.
Both of the assumptions necessary to support the investor protection argument
are deeply flawed. As Professor Gordon has observed, in sophisticated economies
with robust securities markets, investors do not need to be informed to protect them-
selves. Securities markets are "efficient." Stock market analysts and other market
participants aggregate and reflect all relevant available information concerning the
firm into a single data point: the firm's share price.
As noted above, for the investor protection argument to be successful in
providing a justification for mandatory terms in corporate statutes, the market must
4. Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate Field: A Critique of Eisen-
berg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530 (1989).
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somehow be incapable of pricing novel terms in corporate charters. However, this is
extremely unlikely. First, unlike inside information, the information contained in
corporate charters is publicly available.
A charter term that significantly affected risk or return should be noticed
by the informed investor, in the same way that any other business factor
would be noticed. . . . Under a regime of contractual freedom, it would
be astonishing if, for example, a firm junked annual election of directors
in favor of a self-perpetuating board without affecting the issuance price
of the next common stock offering. In other words, if mandatory provi-
sions were eliminated, then presumably the charter would be subject to
much closer scrutiny and we would readily observe price effects for
significant variations from the standard form.
7
The available empirical evidence supports the conclusion that market prices
adjust to reflect significant variations in charter provisions.8 For example, because of
standard industry practice and long-time New York Stock Exchange rules, public
corporations adhered to a policy of "one-share/one-vote." Under this policy, each
share of stock issued by the company would be entitled to a vote on those issues
about which voting was required. However, studies have shown that when corpora-
tions issued shares with inferior voting rights, these nonvoting or limited voting
shares traded at a discount to voting shares.' Moreover, the empirical evidence
shows that the discounts in share prices for stock issued with inferior voting rights
exist not only for shares issued in initial public offerings, but for shares issued in
recapitalizations as well. 10
This discussion has several implications. First, market participants can readily
learn of novel charter provisions and price them appropriately. In particular, there is
ample evidence from the history of experimentation with special voting provisions,
representation on corporate boards of directors, conversion features of debt and
preferred equity, call provisions, and redemption exposure of debt that novel terms
often emerge through negotiations between issuers and the underwriters who act on
behalf of prospective purchasers.1" The fact that resources are expended by issuers
and underwriters to specify and negotiate over novel provisions in debt instruments
and in corporate charters strongly suggests that these novel provisions are priced by
the market.
Second, when novel terms are injected into corporate charters or bond cove-
nants, they are as likely to benefit investors as to harm them. Issuers, concerned
7. Id. at 1562.
8. Id. at 1563.
9. Ronald C. Lease et al., The Market Value of Control in Publicly Traded Corporations, 11 J.
FIN. ECON. 439, 458 (1983); Ronald C. Lease et al., The Market Value of Differential Voting Rights in
Closely Held Corporations, 57 J. Bus. 443, 451 (1984); Greg A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, Dual-
Class Recapitalizations as Antitakeover Mechanisms, 20 J. FIN. EcON. 129, 129 (1988).
10. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problems of
Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1, 22-26 (1988) (discussing a 1987 SEC study on dual class recapi-
talizations and share prices of publicly traded companies); see also Gordon, supra note 5, at 1563 n.47.
11. Gordon, supra note 5, at 1563.
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with minimizing the costs of raising new capital, recognize they can lower their cost
of capital by agreeing to charter terms that provide greater protection to investors.
Since all parties benefit when such terms are devised, both issuers and investors will
readily agree to new terms that increase the overall value of a firm.
Third, a legal regime that binds participating parties through mandatory legal
rules imposes costly rigidities on the legal system. Firms vary and investors' prefer-
ences vary. As a result of these variations, what is good for one firm with one set of
investors may not be in the interests of a different firm with a different set of inves-
tors. Mandatory rules prohibit investors and issuers from customizing their
operating environments to meet the specific needs of the relevant parties. Similarly,
mandatory legal rules impede corporate law from improving through the develop-
ment of innovative corporate governance structures. In a regime of corporate law
that is characterized by permissive rather than mandatory rules, investors, issuing
firims, lawyers, and investment bankers all have incentives to develop new govern-
ance structures which enable firms to raise capital more cheaply by providing
potential investors with the protection and assurances needed to induce them to
invest at lower cost. By contrast, in a regime of corporate law characterized by
mandatory rules, there are no incentives to innovate.
Even unsophisticated investors who would not ordinarily be expected to study,
evaluate, and price novel provisions are protected by the market's price-setting
mechanism, because these unsophisticated investors pay the market price for the
securities they purchase. This market price reflects the ability of sophisticated
market participants to value novel charter terms and to negotiate with issuers about
how to price such terms. Thus, the argument that shareholders will be systemati-
cally victimized by unexpected, one-sided charter terms is inconsistent with the
available empirical evidence as well as with the modern understanding of how
capital and financial markets function. In sum, as Jensen and Meckling predicted,
issuers, not shareholders, will bear the costs of uncertainty, risk and sub-optimality
in novel charter provisions."" These provisions will be priced appropriately by the
market, and this pricing function will serve to protect all investors, including unso-
phisticated investors.
In response to this discussion, it might be argued that the capital markets will
succeed in pricing major events such as recapitalizations, or the issuance of non-
voting shares in connection with such recapitalizations, but will not be successful in
pricing remote or low probability terms, or terms which will not have a dramatic
effect on shareholder wealth. Professor Jeffrey Gordon provides a complete response
to this concern:
[T]here is little reason to erect and maintain a mandatory set of rules
with presumably costly rigidities to avoid events whose overall expected
effects are low. It would be a bad bargain. In sum, mandatory law
cannot be justified on the basis of an information asymmetry between
12. Michael C. Jensen & William C. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976).
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investors and promoters."8
B. Uncertainty
A second justification for a regime of mandatory legal rules is that without
such mandatory rules, different firms will operate under different sets of rules and
constraints, and these differences will cause uncertainty. In particular, uncertainty
will exist concerning how a particular provision in a corporate charter will be used
by the firm, or interpreted by the board of directors, or interpreted by the courts.
However, as the above discussion indicates, to the extent that non-standard contrac-
tual terms increase the uncertainty surrounding the rights and obligations of issuers
and investors, the costs associated with that uncertainty will be borne by the issuers,
not the investors. From an economic or contractarian perspective, the costs of uncer-
tainty will be borne by the promoters who authored the nonstandard terms. As
Jeffrey Gordon observed:
[P]rospective shareholders will foresee the possibility of unpredictable
effects on firm payouts because of the customized clauses and will insist
on a lower stock price as compensation for this risk. To reduce these
costs, firms will stick closely to the standard forms except where custom-
ized terms produce benefits that outweigh the costs. Two such situations
are possible: where the customized term so improves the functioning of
the firm that the stock price actually increases, or where the customized
term provides a benefit that the promoters prize more highly than the
costs. For example, control over the firm may be so important to the
promoters that they opt for a self-perpetuating board, rather than annual
shareholder elections, notwithstanding the discount in the firm's share
price. In both of these cases, the customized term is superior to the stan-
dard term from the perspective of private wealth maximization. Thus the
uncertainty hypothesis seems to have little explanatory value for
mandatory corporate law.'
4
C. Enabling Rules and Strategic Behavior: The Problem of Mid-Stream
Corporate Changes
An important justification for mandatory rules is that such rules enable issuers
to precommit to investors that they will not propose charter amendments which
reduce shareholder wealth. Entrepreneurs bear the full costs of novel charter provi-
sions when securities are first sold to the public. Such entrepreneurs have strong
incentives to draft customized charter provisions that increase shareholders' wealth
by providing strong protections for investors. But after investors have parted with
their money, a variety of factors conspire to make it difficult for such investors to
protect their interests against "mid-stream" changes contrary to their interests.
13. Gordon, supra note 5, at 1564.
14. Gordon, supra note 5, at 1566-67.
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One problem facing shareholders who are confronted with such mid-stream
corporate changes is that public shareholders are rationally ignorant. That is,
rational individual shareholders will only invest in determining the value of a
proposed charter amendment up to the point at which the costs associated with that
determination are equal to or less than the benefits. This cost-benefit calculation is
likely to result in rational shareholders declining to investigate the likely effects of
proposed charter amendments for two reasons. First, the costs of investigating the
effects of a charter provision are fixed. For a small shareholder these costs may
dwarf the total value of the shareholder's investment. For example, if the costs of
evaluating a charter amendment are $100,000, it would not be rational for a share-
holder with a $50,000 investment to spend the resources necessary to make that
evaluation.
Second, the benefits of making an investigation must be discounted to account
for the fact that charter amendments are subject to shareholder vote and that an
individual shareholder's vote is unlikely to be decisive in any particular corporate
election. Thus, shareholders who investigate the likely effects of a proposed charter
amendment must bear the additional costs of informing their fellow shareholders of
these effects, or else the efforts allocated to conducting the investigation are not
likely to be rewarded.
In addition to rational ignorance, insiders who want to enact charter amend-
ments that reduce shareholder wealth can bundle these welfare-reducing
amendments together with other unrelated proposals which shareholders favor. For
example, during the mid-1980s several large American corporations proposed
charter amendments that would establish a new class of common stock with voting
rights superior to existing classes of stock. To obtain approval from existing share-
holders, management announced plans to make large cash payouts to shareholders,
either through increased dividends or share repurchases. But these dividend payouts
and share repurchases were conditioned on the approval of the new class of stock by
shareholders."5
Similarly, management can propose a single charter provision that imposes a
so-called fair price provision, which insures that firms effectuating a statutory
merger will be required to pay a certain minimum price for the shares they acquire,
with a requirement that mergers receive approval from ninety percent of share-
holders. The fair price provision is likely to benefit shareholders by protecting them
against front-loaded, two-tier offers." On the other hand, the ninety percent
approval requirement may hurt shareholders by making it difficult for them to
accept a hostile bid that increases their wealth.
The insiders' ability to bundle the amendments with these other proposals
forces the shareholders "to take the bitter with the sweet, causing wealth reducing
amendments to be adopted."'" Thus, the spectre of mid-stream corporate changes is
15. Gordon, supra note 10, at 48.
16. Greg A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, Shark Repellants and Stock Prices: The Effects of
Antitakeover Amendments Since 1980, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 127, 142 (1987).
17. Gordon, supra note 5, at 1577.
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a problem that advocates of default rules must address. There are three responses to
the problem of mid-stream changes. Once these responses are properly considered, it
is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the problem of mid-stream corporate
changes does not constitute a concern to a legal regime characterized by default or
enabling rules.
First, it must be recognized that concern about mid-stream corporate changes
is not a concern about enabling rules. It is only a concern about any legal rule that
can easily be changed. If new enabling rules either cannot be changed or can only
be changed with great difficulty, then the problem of mid-stream corporate changes
diminishes or goes away. The reason firms do not make it difficult or impossible to
make mid-stream changes to their corporate charters is that the costs of such hand-
tying behavior are far greater than the benefits. The costs come in the form of
making it difficult or impossible for corporations to change their internal rules of
corporate governance. This rigidity is very damaging to firms that must operate in a
dynamic world characterized by constant change. By contrast, the benefits of this
sort of hand-tying are quite ephemeral. Shareholders are protected from the pros-
pect of opportunistic mid-stream corporate changes from the outset, because market
forces will adjust the prices they initially pay for their shares to account for the
possibility that such changes will be approved.
This analysis is particularly damaging to the argument that rationally ignorant
shareholders are susceptible to being opportunistically exploited through mid-stream
charter amendments. Shareholders can avoid the rational ignorance problem simply
by recognizing the potential problem at the time they buy their shares, and insisting
on charter provisions that make it difficult for mid-stream changes to be made.
The argument that rationally ignorant shareholders will be exploited by mid-
stream changes which harm shareholder interests is an additional problem. As
Roberta Romano has pointed out, the argument assumes, without explanation, that
shareholders always will vote "yes" for charter amendments about which they know
nothing, despite the fact that such amendments may not be in their interests. This
assumption makes no sense. It is at least as likely that rational shareholders will
always vote "no" when such amendments are proposed if they are, in fact, rationally
ignorant.18
It is also easy to over-state the costs faced by shareholders who are attempting
to price charter amendments. First, shareholders recognize that any amendment
which lowers the probability of a takeover occurring will be costly.1 9 Thus, it takes
few if any resources to evaluate this sort of proposed charter alteration. Similarly,
shareholders with diversified portfolios can spread the costs of analyzing a single
charter amendment across all of the firms in the portfolio. This makes it less likely
that diversified shareholders will elect to be rationally ignorant with respect to any
given charter proposal. Finally, as the number of institutional shareholders
increases, the likelihood of rational ignorance as a problem diminishes. Institutional
18. Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corpo-
rate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599, 1612 (1989).
19. Id.
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investors are likely to own large block positions in firms proposing mid-stream
charter provisions, and it will be in their interests to make the investigations neces-
sary to inform themselves about the likely effects of proposed charter amendments.20
Second, just as the provisions that are part of a corporation's initial charter will
be properly priced from the outset, so too will the possibility that subsequent mid-
stream changes to the charter will be properly priced as well. Consequently, both
the issuer and the purchasing shareholders have strong incentives to make sure that
ex post, welfare reducing mid-stream changes do not occur. Thus, if mid-stream
corporate changes are deemed to be a problem, the solution is not to forbid enabling
rules by making corporate law mandatory. Rather, the solution is to improve the
mechanism for promulgating enabling rules by allowing the contracting parties to
make credible commitments that mid-stream corporate changes will not occur.
Third, as a practical matter, there is little if any evidence that shareholders
have in fact ever been coerced into accepting a charter arrangement which was
contrary to their interests. For example, Gordon has argued that shareholders who
approve dual class stock recapitalizations have been coerced into doing so by
"sweeteners" that provide them with higher dividends in exchange for their votes on
the recapitalization. But, as Romano has pointed out, in these situations, insiders
already had effective control of the firms pursuing the recapitalization, because on
average insiders controlled forty percent of the voting stock in firms engaging in
dual class recapitalizations.21 Under these conditions, the value of the voting rights
to the outside shareholders is minimal, and the higher cash flow that came with the
increased dividend payments in exchange for giving up illusory voting rights "is a
welfare-enhancing, and not strategically coercive, transaction."'22
Along these lines, it is important not to exaggerate the extent to which the
problem of bundling enhances management's ability to effectuate mid-stream corpo-
rate changes. As Romano observed: "[M]anagement's ability to bundle beneficial
and opportunistic proposals is limited. No doubt clever drafting of 'add-ons' aids
management. But most proposals of charter amendments are separately placed on
the agenda requiring separate votes."'2" Policymakers concerned with the possibility
that shareholders will be coerced into accepting mid-stream corporate changes
because of management's ability to bundle their proposals together should not
respond by advocating mandatory legal rules. Instead, they should respond by advo-
cating a legal rule requiring that charter amendments be presented to shareholders
individually and not bundled together in an omnibus package.
IV. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF ENABLING RULES
As seen in the preceding Part, none of the arguments in favor of mandatory
rules is persuasive. Equally important, as Roberta Romano has observed, none of




23. Romano, supra note 18, at 1612.
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mining which mandatory rule ought to be adopted."" This Part will examine the
costs and benefits of structuring a system of corporate law around a system of
enabling rules.
At the outset of the discussion, however, a cautionary note is in order. Those
who advocate a system of corporate law and corporate governance that is enabling
rather than mandatory take the view that the freedom of private agreements rather
than the coercion of state-imposed rules is the "general principle" upon which
corporate governance rules for top management should be built.25 However, those
who advocate a system of corporate law based on enabling rules do not make the
argument that such a system is perfect. From the standpoint of developing a
rational, sound public policy, the critical inquiry is not whether a particular
approach to law is perfect, but whether it is superior to the next best alternative.
In particular, those who advocate an enabling approach to corporate law recog-
nize that writing contracts is costly. But that is not an argument against the
enabling approach; it is an argument in favor of a system of corporate law which
furnishes parties with boilerplate language available for adoption by the contracting
parties. One of the roles of the legal system is to furnish off-the-shelf language that
reduces the costs associated with writing contracts.
However, even in this context, it is easy to jump precipitously to the conclusion
that the state is the only source for the off-the-shelf language, and that private
institutions cannot provide standardized legal rules. In fact, private institutions are
an important source of standardized legal rules, particularly in the realm of corpo-
rate law. Law firms, accounting firms, institutional investors, stock exchanges, bond
rating agencies, underwriters, and a myriad of other institutions constitute sources
of standardization.
A. Innovation and Mistake
The argument for enabling as opposed to mandatory rules becomes particularly
strong if we start with the basic premise that we live in a complex, ever-changing
world in which two assumptions clearly hold. The first assumption is that in
advanced societies information is constantly being produced. The second assumption
is that even the best-intentioned human beings make mistakes.
In light of these two basic assumptions, it appears clear that an advantage of
enabling rules over mandatory rules is that enabling rules permit corporations to
change their rules of governance to adapt to changing circumstances and new ideas.
Clearly, innovation should be encouraged. Innovation is far more likely under a
legal system in which corporate law is enabling than under a legal regime in which
corporate law is mandatory for a variety of reasons. First, it is simply less costly for
a corporate board of directors to reach agreement than for a national legislature.
The board of directors has greater expertise about corporate affairs, and enjoys
better access to the necessary information. Even the best intentioned legislature will
have the time and inclination to focus its attention on matters of corporate law only
24. Romano, supra note 18, at 1615.
25. McChesney, supra note 4, at 1533.
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episodically.
In the United States, jurisdictional competition among states for corporate
chartering revenues forces states to be responsive to technological innovations.
Empirical evidence shows a significant positive correlation between a state's respon-
siveness to innovation in its corporation codes and the proportion of state revenues
derived from incorporation (franchise) taxes.2 In other words, states are forced to
innovate to prevent the firms that are locally chartered from migrating to other,
more responsive states, particularly Delaware.
In addition, directors have incentives to adopt innovative, value-maximizing
legal rules that legislators do not have. Adopting a useful new legal rule will allow a
firm's managers to raise capital more cheaply. Managers who also own stock in the
firms where they work have incentives to do this. Even managers who are more
concerned with empire-building than with maximizing firm value have an incentive
to lower the cost of raising new capital to fund their expansionist plans. Thus,
managers will want to develop innovative corporate governance mechanisms that
allow them to induce investors to supply capital to their firms.
Relatively recent corporate governance devices that provide event-risk protec-
tion for investors illustrate how legal innovations are made. During the late 1980s
and early 1990s, a number of corporate control transactions, particularly leveraged
buyouts, occurred in which bondholders suffered substantial losses.27 Bondholder
losses were the result of the so-called "leverage effect," in which the additional
layers of debt benefit the shareholders at the expense of bondholders. These share-
holders, as residual claimants, enjoy huge returns on equity if their firm performs
only modestly better than expected, while the fixed claimants suffer as the increased
leverage dramatically increases the probability of bankruptcy for the firm. Since the
bondholders, as fixed claimants, do not benefit if the firm out-performs expectations,
a corporate transaction that increases firm leverage increases the default risk
without a concomitant increase in the bondholders' return. Consistent with this
reasoning, empirical studies have shown that bond values decline substantially in the
wake of leveraged acquisition.28
However, corporations are beginning to solve the problems associated with
wealth transfers from bondholders to shareholders by including contractual provi-
sions in their bond indentures that protect bondholders. These provisions, known as
event-risk covenants or, more popularly, as "poison puts," provide that bondholders
26. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 225 (1985).
27. The two best known examples are the management buyout of RJR Nabisco, in which the price
of RJR Nabisco bonds dropped in value by 20% after executives announced they were considering a
management buyout of the company, and the leveraged recapitalization of Colt Industries, where the
value of Colt's bonds declined by 20% when management announced that $1.4 billion in equity would be
replaced with debt. Kenneth N. Gilpin, Bid for RJR Nabisco Jolts Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1987, at
D 11; see also George Anders, "Recapitalizations' Are a Bonanza for Some, But Bondholders Can Take
a Terrific Beating, WALL ST. J., June 1, 1987, § 2, at 53.
28. Richard G. Clemens, Poison Debt: The New Takeover Defense, 42 Bus. LAw. 747 (1987);
Daniel Hertzberg, 'Poison-Put' Bonds Are Latest Weapon in Companies' Anti-Takeover Strategy, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 13, 1986, at 5.
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have either the right to sell their bonds back to the company at a pre-determined
price or the right to an automatic increase in the interest rate payable on the bonds
upon the occurrence of a specified event. Not only do these covenants help reduce
the agency costs associated with debt, they can also increase the overall value of the
firm by lowering the costs of raising capital from fixed claimants. If experimentation
were not allowed, innovations like poison puts would not be possible. Numerous
examples demonstrate how mandatory rules hamper innovation. In the early stages
of the development of American corporate law, courts imposed a mandatory rule,
called the "vested rights" rule, that prohibited corporations from altering the rights
of shareholders after their shares had been issued. Vested rights theory was used to
prohibit corporations from issuing securities senior in dividend or liquidation prefer-
ence to outstanding securities, to permit shareholders to convert their common stock
into a new class of preferred stock carrying a seven percent dividend upon the
payment of a token fee, or to reduce the dividends payable to a particular class of
preferred shareholder.29 For decades, courts "repeatedly rejected attempts to alter a
security's terms as an impairment of vested rights, usually without examining the
fairness of the transactions."80
It is easy to see why shareholders would want to alter their own vested rights
under certain conditions. For example, preferred shareholders might all agree to
accept a lower dividend payout if that is the only way to avoid bankruptcy. Simi-
larly, a firm that is on the verge of insolvency and desperately in need of new capital
is unlikely to be able to raise such new capital unless it is able to offer the new
investors senior securities. Under these circumstances, all shareholders might agree
ex ante to offer a preference to new providers of capital. However, if an out-moded
legal theory like the vested rights doctrine gives a single shareholder the ability to
block a firm's ex post efforts to recapitalize, hold-up problems will inevitably occur.
As Professor Coffee has observed:
This concept of vested rights thus essentially froze the corporation's
capital structure and denied the corporation the flexibility to pursue new
objectives or to issue new classes of securities not authorized at the
moment of corporate formation. Beginning in the decade between 1910
and 1920, however, courts began to free corporate law from the strait-
jacket of vested rights theory. Decisions gradually permitted the
authorization and issuance of new classes of securities not in the original
certificate of incorporation. 1
The evolution of the so-called legal capital rules in the United States regulating
the sale of stock provides still another illustration of how inflexible mandatory rules
not only harm corporations by making it difficult to raise capital in times of
economic difficulty, but also lead to strategic behavior by shareholders. For decades
it was illegal to sell stock for less than the par value in the United States. The
29. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the
Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1618, 1640-41 (1989).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1641.
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purpose of this mandatory legal rule was to protect creditors and shareholders by
providing them with an indication of the price paid for shares by prior investors.
Over time, however, it became clear that any marginal benefits to shareholders
provided by this rule were greatly outweighed by the costs. In particular, firms were
unable to sell additional stock whenever the market value of the firm's stock
dropped below the par value of the shares. Over time, a rule that was originally
designed to protect creditors and shareholders became what Professor Coffee aptly
described as a "legal trap for the unwary. '" 2
When the mandatory rule requiring par value stock began to harm share-
holders and firms, common law courts began to distort the law through dubious
technicalities to allow firms and investors to avoid the rule. For example, in Handley
v. Stutz,38 the United States Supreme Court permitted a firm to exchange $45,000
in face amount of its bonds along with stock with a total par value of $45,000 with
an investor who was injecting $45,000 in cash into the firm. In this transaction:
[T]he stock was issued at below its par value, probably as an equity
"kicker" or throw-in to make the purchase of the bonds more attractive.
The Supreme Court easily could have required strict adherence to the
traditional rule invalidating watered stock. . . .Yet it did not. Instead it
focused on the economics of the transaction and essentially recognized
that if a stock's market value fell below its par value, the corporation
would be precluded from issuing shares."
Sometime after the Supreme Court's decision in Handley v. Stutz, state legisla-
tures slowly began changing their rules to permit the issuance of stock without par
value, which is now the dominant rule in the United States. Three useful implica-
tions can be drawn from this illustration about no-par stock. The first implication is
that the development of capital markets and the emergence of increasingly sophisti-
cated investors rendered the old mandatory rule obsolete. The inability to alter the
rule imposed severe costs on firms in need of capital. The second implication is that
common law systems can alter mandatory rules relatively easily by generating judi-
cial opinions which ameliorate the harmful effects of mandatory rules.
A final implication of this example stems from the basic fact that lawsuits like
Handley v. Stutz were being brought against firms trying to raise capital by selling
stock. The technical legal restrictions imposed by mandatory rules provided an
opportunity for opportunistic shareholders to bring a lawsuit to extract a side-
payment from the firm. Basic economic theory shows that as long as the new share-
holders are paying the market price for the new stock being sold, existing
shareholders are not being harmed by the new issuance. The only explanation for
the suit is that the plaintiffs are acting opportunistically and strategically. Changing
from a regime of mandatory rules to a regime of enabling rules would reduce the
incidence of strategic behavior. Enabling rules would replace a system in which a
32. Id. at 1639.
33. 138 U.S. 417 (1890).
34. Coffee, supra note 29, at 1636.
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single shareholder can block a beneficial transaction with one in which a majority of
shareholders can approve needed changes to corporate governance structures.
B. The Policy-Maker's Dilemma
As suggested above, perhaps the most important advantage that the enabling
approach to corporate governance enjoys over the mandatory approach is its greater
flexibility in dealing with the complex decisions confronting corporate managers. A
particularly intractable problem for regulators advocating a mandatory approach to
corporate law is a phenomenon I have described as the "policymaker's dilemma."
8 5
The dilemma is that mandatory rules devised by policymakers in the field of corpo-
rate governance do not benefit all shareholders in all firms. Instead, such mandatory
rules simply transfer wealth from the shareholders in some firms to the shareholders
in other firms. The reason the policymaker's dilemma arises is that no system of
rules for corporate governance can possibly benefit all shareholders in all firms.
Put differently, it simply is not possible for policymakers to benefit shareholders
by developing rules that successfully regulate whole classes of corporate transac-
tions. The reason for this is that every corporate governance device available to
corporate decision-makers can be used either to harm shareholders or to benefit
shareholders. Mandatory rules are, by their very nature, categorical. They either
permit a firm to engage in a certain category of transaction, or they forbid corpora-
tions to engage in those categories.
Those who advocate enabling rules recognize that every device, scheme, trans-
action, or governance structure available to corporate decision-makers can be used
both to hinder and to advance the interests of corporate shareholders. This duplicity
applies not only to controversial and relatively complex innovations like poison pills
and corporate greenmail payments, but also to venerable and seemingly benign
activities, such as staggered terms for members of corporate boards of directors,
dividend payments to shareholders, and the issuance of new shares of stock.
The policymaker's dilemma can perhaps best be illustrated in the context of the
takeover market, where the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers
is very pronounced and well documented. The dilemma exists because every corpo-
rate governance device that might possibly be devised by management can be used
either to maximize shareholder wealth, or to entrench existing management. More-
over, as the following examples will show, it is impossible to benefit investors by
developing categorical rules banning or permitting corporate practices. This is
because it is impossible to determine in advance whether a particular corporate
action or pattern of corporate decision-making will benefit or harm shareholders.
1. Seemingly Benign Rules can be Nefarious
In every state, corporations are permitted by law to classify or stagger the
35. See Jonathan R. Macey, Takeover Defense Tactics and Legal Scholarship: Market Forces
Versus the Policymaker's Dilemma, 96 YALE L.J. 342 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey, Courts and Corpora-
tions: A Comment on Coffee, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1692 (1989).
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terms of members of their boards of directors. Staggering allows the election of only
one-half or one-third of the board at each annual shareholders' meeting. Directors
are elected for two or three year terms rather than one-year terms. Permitting stag-
gered terms for board members has been justified on several grounds. It protects
against sudden changes in management of the corporation. It allows for continuity
within the board. Finally, staggered boards serve the salutary purpose of encour-
aging directors to develop particular knowledge about the firms they are serving by
assuring directors that they will not be displaced precipitously. Even the most
forceful proponents of mandatory rules of corporate governance do not advocate
banning corporations from allowing directors to have staggered terms.
Despite the potential benefits, staggered boards are sometimes used by incum-
bent management to make unwanted takeover attempts more difficult to
effectuate. 6 In addition, staggering can reduce the impact of cumulative voting,
because a greater number of votes is required to elect a director if the board is
staggered than is required if the entire board were elected at each annual meeting.3 7
The point here is that one corporation might use staggered terms for directors to
increase shareholder wealth, while another corporation might use staggered terms to
decrease it.
Similarly, as was suggested above, a decision by a corporation to issue new
shares of stock can benefit investors under some circumstances and harm them
under others. When new shares are issued to raise needed capital to fund positive
present value projects, all investors benefit. Sometimes new shares can only be sold
if the issuing corporation either alters the rights of existing shareholders, or gives
new shares priority over pre-existing shares. But when new shares are issued to
benefit one investor group over another, either by diluting the investment of one
group or by giving some investors a preference in bankruptcy, the issuance of new
shares can harm rather than benefit the firm. Unfortunately, in the early 1900s,
when the legal doctrine of vested rights prevented corporations from issuing senior
securities, mandatory rules inevitably harmed shareholders by freezing the capital
structure of corporations during times of economic stress-precisely when corpora-
tions most need flexibility. Corporate dividend payout practices provide yet another
example of how seemingly benign corporate practices ultimately can have a harmful
effect on shareholders. It is a basic tenet of corporate finance that, while a firm's
capital structure may not affect the firm's cost of capital, changes in capital struc-
ture can affect the distribution of wealth among the various classes of corporate
36. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, OFFICIAL TEXT WITH OFFICIAL COMMENTS AND STATUTORY
CROSS REFERENCES 225 (1991).
37. Cumulative voting is a voting system designed to enhance the ability of minority shareholders
to obtain representation on a corporation's board of directors. Cumulative voting accomplishes this by
permitting each shareholder to cast a total number of votes equal to the number of shares owned, multi-
plied by the number of directors to be elected. Cumulative voting enhances the ability of minority
shareholders to elect directors by allowing each shareholder to allocate all of their votes to a single
director or to a small number of directors. By reducing the number of directors to be elected at each
election, staggered boards of directors reduce the efficacy of cumulative voting by reducing the total votes
minority shareholders are able to cast at each election.
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claimants. Thus, for example, if a corporation historically has been funded with fifty
percent equity and fifty percent debt, and then makes an unanticipated change in its
capital structure that causes the firm to have only ten percent equity and ninety
percent debt, the change will effectuate a wealth transfer from bondholders to
shareholders. By increasing dividends, corporate boards of directors can transfer
wealth from bondholders to shareholders by changing a corporation's capital struc-
ture. On the other hand, corporate boards of directors also can transfer wealth in
the other direction, from shareholders to bondholders, by declining to pay dividends.
Judge Easterbrook has observed in an important article about corporate dividend
policy:
Suppose a firm has an initial capitalization of 100, of which 50 is debt
and 50 is equity. It invests 100 in a project. The firm prospers and earn-
ings raise its holdings to 200. The creditors now have substantially more
security than they started with, and correspondingly the residual claim-
ants are paying the creditors a rate of interest unwarranted by current
circumstances. They can correct the situation by paying a dividend of 50
while issuing new debt worth 50. The firm's capital continues to be 200,
but the debt-equity ratio has been restored, and the interest rate on the
original debt is again appropriate to the creditors' risk.
88
Thus, depending on investors' expectations, paying dividends can transfer
wealth from bondholders to shareholders while declining to pay dividends and
financing projects out of retained earnings can transfer wealth from shareholders to
bondholders. It is impossible to legislate dividend policy to curb these sorts of wealth
transfers, because there is no way to determine whether a particular corporate deci-
sion to pay dividends is done to transfer wealth, or to re-establish a pre-existing
capital structure. Moreover, the discussion demonstrates that just as the decision to
pay dividends can cause a wealth transfer, so too can a decision to decline to pay
dividends.
2. Seemingly Nefarious Rules Can Be Benign
Just as seemingly benign corporate practices and policies can be used for nefa-
rious purposes, so too can seemingly nefarious corporate actions, like paying
greenmail or enacting so-called "poison pill" shareholder rights plans, actually
provide substantial benefits for large classes of shareholders. Both poison pills and
greenmail have been widely criticized as unsavory mechanisms through which
incumbent management of public corporations can abuse corporate governance
structures to hinder outside bidders' attempts to mount successful takeovers.
Poison pills can take a variety of forms. In general, poison pills involve the
distribution to existing shareholders of certain "rights" which are: (1) exercisable by
the shareholders only upon the occurrence of certain defined conditions, such as the
acquisition of a sizeable block of stock in the company by another firm; (2) callable
38. Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 650,
655 (1984).
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by the corporation at a nominal price whenever the board of directors so decides;
and (3) discriminatory, in the sense that the rights conveyed by the poison pill are
not extended to certain categories of shareholders, such as large block purchasers.
This discussion will focus on the so-called "flip-in" pill, which enables all shares
of the same class other than those held by the bidder to purchase shares at a large
discount on the occurrence of certain conditions, such as the acquisition of a single
large block of shares. Criticism of this poison pill stems from the fact that it is an
extremely effective tool for thwarting outside bidders' takeover attempts. On the
other hand, the "flip-in" pill is an extremely effective tool for maximizing share-
holder wealth by preventing outside bidders from acquiring control of a company
too cheaply.
For example, suppose that a firm's stock is trading at $50 per share. Suppose
further that management is in negotiations with a merger partner willing to pay $80
for the outstanding shares. A poison pill can be used to prevent a bidder from
acquiring control of the corporation for $60 during the pending negotiations.
Similarly, the poison pill is an extremely effective device in the large publicly
held corporation for preventing outside bidders from exploiting collective action
problems that plague public shareholders. Suppose that a firm has 100 shares of
stock outstanding, and that the market price for those shares is $50. If an outside
bidder acquires effective control of the corporation by acquiring fifty-one shares for
a slight premium and uses its controlling position for its own selfish benefit, the
bidder can profit by obtaining control even if that control causes the overall value of
the firm to decline.
The possibility that a corporation's shares can be acquired by an outside bidder
in stages presents another collective action problem for target firm shareholders that
poison pills can remedy. In particular, after a firm has acquired a controlling
interest in another firm, the bidding firm can cause a merger between itself (or a
wholly owned subsidiary) and the target firm. This merger eliminates the equity
interests of the remaining shareholders in the surviving firm. This second step is
commonly referred to as a "take-out merger," or a "freeze-out merger." Studies
have shown that as the size of the target firms involved in takeover battles increases,
two-tier bids, in which an initial bid is followed by a take-out merger, replace any-
or-all bids as the most common form of tender .3 Even though initial bidders may
not announce a second (take-out) step at the time of the initial tender offer, seventy-
two percent of successful tender offers are followed by a take-out merger within five
years.
Outside bidders use two-step takeover bids for a variety of reasons. Obviously,
this strategy is less expensive than bidding to buy all of the stock in a target
company. It is also less risky, because it allows the outside bidder to acquire control
and to assess its ability to run the target company before committing the resources
necessary to obtain complete control.
The outside bidder also benefits from placing the shareholders of the target
39. Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail,
95 YALE L.J. 13, 26 (1985).
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firm in a prisoner's dilemma that leads them to tender their shares. Game theorists
use the term "prisoner's dilemma" to describe a situation where the inability of
individuals-in this case shareholders-to coordinate their decisions leads to a
suboptimal outcome from their perspective. This enables bidders to gain control of
target firms at bargain basement prices. To illustrate the coordination problem:
[A]ssume a cash tender offer of $40 per share for half of the outstanding
shares of a target firm where the pre-tender offer market price was $30.
Further assume that if the offer fails, the target firm's stock is expected
to experience a permanent upward revaluation to $37, to reflect the new
information about the target's value disclosed by the tender offer.
Finally, assume that the bidder has announced that the transaction will
take the form of the typical two-step takeover, in which the bidder will
pay cash for the first 50% of the shares tendered at the tender offer
price and will either take the remainder that are tendered or engage in a
takeout merger for the bidder's debt securities valued at $30 per target
share. If the tender offer period is typically brief and target shareholders
typically numerous, there will be no real opportunity for such share-
holders to communicate with each other and to reach a collective
determination of the best course of action for all. If they could reach
such a decision, they would agree that rejecting the tender offer and
holding target shares worth $37 would be preferable to having half or
more of the shares tendered, in which case they would receive an average
price of only $35.00 per share.
4 0
The dilemma inherent in this situation is apparent. For illustrative purposes,
suppose that the target firm has 101 shares outstanding, and that the bidder already
owns one share. The remaining 100 shares are divided evenly between two share-
holders, A and B, who are unable to communicate with each other. From A's
viewpoint, the decision not to tender means that either he will retain 50 shares
worth $37 each if B also decides not to tender, or that he will retain 50 shares to be
taken later for $30 per share in the subsequent take out merger if B decides to
tender into the initial $40 bid. Thus, by not tendering, the best that A can do is
receive $37 for his shares, and the worst that A can do is receive $30 for his shares.
The outcome will depend on what B does.
Alternatively, if A decides to tender his shares, he will obtain $40 per share if
B does not tender, but only $35 per share if B also tenders.4 '1 This is a prisoner's
dilemma, because A can only protect himself from the worst possible outcome and
40. This example is taken from William J. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repel-
lents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 AM. B. FouND. REs. J., 341, 350-
51.
41. A receives $35.00 if B tenders because, under U.S. securities law, if a tender offer is over-
subscribed, each tendering shareholder will have his shares purchased on a pro-rata basis. Thus, in this
example, A and B each will have 25 shares purchased for the initial price of $40.00 and 25 shares taken
in the take-out merger for $30.00. This results in a blended price to each shareholder of $35.00 per share
if both tender.
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have an opportunity to obtain the best possible outcome by tendering his shares at
the initial bid price of $40 per share. B, of course, faces the same choices, and their
separate decisions will lead to a net result of $35 per share for each of them, which
is worse than the $37 they could have obtained through coordinated action. By
using the poison pill, management raises the aggregate price that a successful bidder
must pay to acquire control of a target firm, and eliminates the prisoner's dilemma.
A target firm's board of directors can insist on a price greater than $37 per share in
exchange for redeeming the outstanding poison pills. Thus, "the poison pill provides
a paradigm of a novel contractual provision that can arguably be used either to
maximize shareholder wealth or to entrench existing management--depending on
how it is used."4
Thus, policymakers attempting to ban poison pills might benefit certain share-
holders, those in firms lucky enough to receive initial bids in excess of $37, but
would do so at the expense of other shareholders, who would be subject to exploita-
tion by outside bidders. Moreover, the usefulness of poison pills is not limited to the
context of two-tier bids. Poison pills will increase shareholders' wealth whenever
they are used to provide corporate managers with sufficient additional time
following an initial offer to permit an auction market for the firm to develop. All-or-
nothing bids typically are conditioned on receiving a certain percentage of
outstanding shares within a certain time-frame. This decreases the likelihood of
subsequent bidders trumping the initial offer. Under such circumstances, poison pills
are a useful device for obtaining a delay to see if better offers develop.
The above analysis applies not only to poison pills but to all defensive tactics.
All defensive tactics mitigate the effect of the prisoner's dilemma facing target
shareholders and raise the aggregate price that a successful bidder must pay for
target shareholders' stock. Of course, defensive tactics are not without cost. In
particular, there is almost always the danger that the defensive tactics will substan-
tially raise the cost of an outside acquisition, so that no bids are made for the target.
An important exception to this general rule is the payment of corporate greenmail,
perhaps the most widely excoriated of all defensive tactics.
Greenmail lowers bidders' costs because of two important, albeit frequently
ignored, features of greenmail payments. First, unlike the transfers of wealth associ-
ated with other defensive tactics such as poison pills, outside bidders receive
greenmail payments directly. Thus, greenmail payments represent a source of addi-
tional profits to an outside bidder rather than a source of potential loss. Second, an
outside bidder can decide for himself whether to accept a greenmail payment, and
thus can decline to accept a greenmail payment that does not provide sufficient
compensation.
Thus, from the perspective of target firm shareholders, greenmail is different
from all other defensive tactics, because it does not pose the risk that bidders will
find the cost of takeover too high and decline to make a bid in the first place. More-
over, the prospect of greenmail improves corporate performance by raising the
overall level of monitoring of potential target firms by outside bidders:
42. Coffee, supra note 29, at 1653.
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Thus the payment of greenmail where there is a realistic threat of a
takeover allows target shareholders to "have their cake and eat it too."
Greenmail allows the firm to make unwanted suitors go away without
discouraging them from producing information about the target firm in
the first place. And, unlike other deferisive tactics such as shark repellent
amendments, greenmail does not discourage additional tender offerors
from making offers, but rather encourages them. The ability to pay
greenmail thus increases the probability of a takeover attempt occurring
while other defensive tactics lower it.
48
3. Concluding Observations
This discussion of greenmail suggests that there is another aspect of the poli-
cymaker's dilemma that further suggests the superiority of enabling rules over
mandatory rules. The first aspect of the policymaker's dilemma which provides
support for a system of enabling rules lies in the fact that every contractual provi-
sion or governance device in the corporate world can be used either to maximize
shareholder wealth, or to transfer wealth from shareholders and other investors to
other groups. Consequently, it simply is not possible for even the most benign and
well-meaning central planner to devise mandatory rules that benefit all share-
holders. Only a system of enabling rules, which permits firms to customize their own
internal rules of corporate governance to meet the particularized, individual needs of
their investors, can serve the goals of public policy.
The analysis of corporate greenmail presented here has additional implications
for policy analysis. First, it suggests that even within single firms rigid rules may be
inappropriate. It may be in the shareholders' interests that greenmail be paid to
fend off one outside bidder, but not another. Flexibility is important. Second, the
limits of human understanding are such that corporate practices which may appear
to policymakers to be contrary to shareholders' interests may, in fact, benefit
shareholders.
Consistent with the view that corporate law should serve as a standard form
contract, the emphasis of this discussion is not to argue that corporate law should
endorse the payment of corporate greenmail. The point is that a legal system of
mandatory rules which apply to all firms and all situations cannot provide the
customization needed. Thus, while standard-form contracts serve a valuable purpose
in lowering transaction costs, which maximizes shareholder wealth, firms must be
allowed to alter the standard-form rules to meet the particular needs of their
investors.
C. The Economic Theory of Regulation
Until now, the discussion of the relative desirability of mandatory rules versus
enabling rules has presumed that policymakers have access to the same set of regu-
43. Macey & McChesney, supra note 39, at 26.
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lations, and have the same set of incentives as shareholders and other investors. But
this is not the case. The economic theory of regulation has shown that politicians are
likely to make politically motivated decisions rather than economically motivated
decisions:
The economic theory of regulation applies to the legislative process by
which legal rules that govern the affairs of corporations are made. Share-
holders are a diffuse and poorly organized pressure group; management,
by contrast, is concentrated and well organized, and thus is more likely
to carry the day politically. One therefore predicts, and in fact finds, that
shareholders cannot count on the legislature to do what is best for them.
The prevalence of state antitakeover statutes, for example, demonstrates
how the law-using mandatory rules around which shareholders may not
be able to contract-can be used to benefit management (and labor) at
the expense of shareholders in the firm."'
The overwhelming theoretical and empirical support for the economic theory of
regulation provides a significant obstacle to those who criticize the enabling
approach to corporate law. Managers, directors, and controlling shareholders are
subject to a variety of market constraints that limit their ability to act selfishly. For
this reason alone, private ordering seems desirable. While managers and directors
seldom own controlling interests in the firms for which they work, top managers
often have a significant portion of their personal wealth invested in their firms.
4 5
Moreover, the income they receive can be viewed as an annuity. This annuity virtu-
ally always represents the largest single source of wealth for corporate managers.
Thus, there is no reason to believe that politicians and bureaucrats are any more
benign, selfless, and impartial than the corporate managers, directors, and control-
ling shareholders whose authority would be displaced in a legal regime governed by
mandatory rules. For these reasons, it is not surprising that experienced observers of
corporate behavior, such as Professor Eisenberg, have noted that managerial
conscience is generally consistent with shareholders' interests."6
In addition, managers, directors, and controlling shareholders inevitably will
have better information about the corporation than politicians and bureaucrats.
Corporate managers are experts. They have localized knowledge of the particular
needs and unique conditions that affect their firms. Even the most benign politicians
and bureaucrats lack this sort of expertise and information.
The validity of the economic theory of regulation requires those who favor
mandatory rules not only to find flaws in the enabling approach, but also to show
that the government regulations involved in a mandatory system of corporate law
44. McChesney, supra note 4, at 1544 (citing Jonathan R. Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legisla-
tion and the National Economy, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 467, 469-71; Roberta Romano, The Political
Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 145-87 (1987)).
45. Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON.
375 (1983).
46. Melvin A. Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse in the Corporate Law Literature, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 582, 589-90, 596 (1984).
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offer a superior alternative. To put the matter differently, neither those who favor a
contractual approach to corporate law or those who favor a mandatory approach
can demonstrate that their approach solves all of the problems facing investors and
managers in public corporations. To prevail in the relevant policy debate, one side
* should show that it is better than the alternative approach.
At this point, one might well ask why shareholders are more successful at
protecting their own interests and investments within the corporation than within
the legislature. The evidence from the recent wave of state anti-takeover legislation
within the United States strongly suggests that managers believe that lobbying the
legislature is a surer or cheaper means of obtaining protection than risking a share-
holder vote. 47 One reason for this is that the negative effects on shareholder wealth
which are caused by enacting rules contrary to shareholders' interests are immedi-
ately observable when those rules are enacted at the firm level. However, when such
rules are enacted at the state or national level, and affect large numbers of firms
simultaneously, the wealth effect on individual firms is far harder to discern.
Shareholders are better able to protect their own interests at the firm level than
in the legislative arena. Free rider problems that prevent shareholders from galva-
nizing into an effective political coalition at the national level are greatly reduced at
the firm level. The economic theory of regulation predicts that laws are likely to
benefit the few at the expense of the many, because no one has an incentive to enact
laws which benefit the people in general. This is the classic "free-rider" problem
that inevitably plagues public interest legislation in a representative democracy.
Because the benefits of public-interest legislation are spread among everyone in the
population, individual members of the public lack sufficient incentives to promote
public interest laws since all the costs of such promotion must be absorbed by the
promoters themselves. It is extremely unlikely that any individual will find it advan-
tageous to devote privately the necessary resources needed to obtain legislation that
is in the interests of all shareholders in all corporations. The investment will involve
obtaining the necessary information to know what is in the interests of all share-
holders in all corporations, as well as the resources necessary to communicate that
information in a coherent fashion within national policy circles. Since any gains
from this investment go to every shareholder in the society, those who contribute
nothing benefit just as much as those who have contributed a great deal. Thus, it
pays for each individual to do nothing and to hope that others will make the neces-
sary efforts. This is the essence of the "free rider" problem.
Members of small groups can overcome the free rider problem more easily than
members of large groups. For one thing, as groups become smaller, individuals will
be able to capture a greater share of any gains associated with making marginal
improvements in governance structures. In addition, as Richard Posner has
observed, "the fewer the prospective beneficiaries of a regulation, the easier it will
be for them to coordinate their efforts to obtain regulation.'
48
47. Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 22 (Feb. 23, 1992) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Journal of Corporation Law).
48. Richard A. Posner, Theories of [Elconomic [Riegulation, 5 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. So.
[Winter
HeinOnline -- 18 J. Corp. L. 206 1992-1993
Contractual Perspective
In summary, the implication of the economic theory of regulation for the
mandatory/enabling debate is that, if all else is equal, the authority to make deci-
sions that affect corporations ought to be delegated to the decision-maker whose
incentives are most closely aligned with the interests of shareholders and other
investors. While managers' incentives may diverge from the incentives of investors,
over a wide range of issues their interests coincide closely. Additionally, a variety of
forces bring those interests even more closely into alignment. These market forces
include competition in the capital market, competition in the internal and external
managerial labor markets, competition in the products markets, and incentive-based
managerial compensation contracts.
D. The Empirical Evidence
Ultimately, the best way of evaluating the relative desirability of an enabling
regime of corporate law, as opposed to a mandatory regime, is by examining the
relevant empirical evidence. Neither alternative is perfect. Theoretical claims of
superiority for one system over another can always be made in the absence of empir-
ical evidence. Because corporate law is generally a matter of state law, the variety
of laws in the fifty states provides a useful natural laboratory for testing the relative
advantages of alternative legal regimes.
The most striking thing about the jurisdictional competition for corporate char-
ters is that "[w]ithin the federal structure, one state, Delaware, which is a small
state by any measure-population, geography, industrial or agricultural produc-
tion-has dominated all the rest."'4 9 Since the early 1920s, Delaware has been
winning the jurisdictional competition for corporate charters on any measure.
Approximately one-half of the largest industrial firms in the United States are
incorporated in Delaware,50 and about forty percent of corporations that are listed
on organized stock exchanges in the United States are chartered in Delaware."1
Several aspects of Delaware's dominance of the jurisdictional competition for
corporate charters are relevant to this discussion. Delaware is the state with the
most flexible and adaptable corporate code. Delaware corporate law is almost
completely enabling. For example, Delaware corporate law permits the certificate of
incorporation to contain a provision:
[Elliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corpo-
ration or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary
duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or
limit the liability of a (i) director for any breach of the director's duty of
loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders."3
335, 345 (1974).
49. Romano, supra note 47, at 1.
50. Romano, supra note 26, at 261 n.49.
51. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware
Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 478 (1987).
52. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1992).
19931
HeinOnline -- 18 J. Corp. L. 207 1992-1993
The Journal of Corporation Law
Similarly, Delaware corporations have the power to issue "[s]hares of stock
without par value . . for such consideration, as is determined from time to time by
the board of directors."53 And, finally, the general restrictions on business combina-
tions with interested directors can be waived if the shareholders approve. "
The great flexibility of Delaware law must be interpreted in light of empirical
studies of the effects of reincorporation by corporations from other states to Dela-
ware on shareholder wealth. These studies uniformly have found that shareholders
benefit when their firms change their situs of incorporation to Delaware. These
empirical studies, conducted over a period of years by a variety of financial econo-
mists, use an accepted econometric technique called the event study to measure the
effect of specific unexpected events on a firm's share prices." When firms announce
their intention to relocate to Delaware, share prices go up.
Delaware is not only the state with the most flexible corporate law, it is also the
state whose corporate law is the most responsive to outside innovations." Studies
have shown that Delaware often invents new corporate law rules to respond to
changing circumstances. Even when Delaware does not invent a new code provision,
it is the first to imitate the code provisions invented by other states. This provides
further support for the fact that the best corporate law is the corporate law that is
flexible and responsive to change. There is no question that enabling rules are more
flexible and responsive than mandatory rules.
Examining what corporations actually do when applicable corporate law rules
permit flexibility provides another source of empirical support for the enabling
approach to corporate law. For example, as mentioned earlier, corporate greenmail
payments have been widely attacked as being harmful to shareholders. Those
favoring a mandatory approach to corporate law have advocated that greenmail
payments be banned outright.
Four major econometric studies of the effects of greenmail payments on share-
holder wealth have produced interesting results. These studies analyze the entire
greenmail process to determine the net effect on shareholders' wealth from the time
the greenmailer makes his initial purchase of stock in the target firm to the time the
greenmail payment is actually made.
57
Three of these studies found the overall effects of the greenmail process on
shareholder wealth to be statistically significant and positive. That is to say, when a
greenmailer makes his initial purchase of stock in the target firm, there is a large,
positive effect on share prices. Later, when the greenmail is paid, there is a smaller,
negative effect on share prices. On average, the net effect of the entire greenmail
process is positive. As the authors of one study concluded, "it is striking 'that when
53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 153(b) (1992).
54. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(3) (1992).
55. Allen Hyman, The Delaware Controversy--The Legal Debate, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 368 (1979);
Peter Dodd & Richard Lcftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" Versus
Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980).
56. Romano, supra note 26, at 280.
57. See Macey & McChesney, supra note 39, at 44-48 (extensively discussing studies by
Mikkelson & Ruback, Holderness & Sheehan, Poulsen, and Jarrell & Ryngaert).
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the final outcome of an investment is a standstill agreement with the target firm, the
total return earned by target shareholders is positive, even though the price effect of
the standstill or repurchase announcement is negative.' 68 Indeed, even if we ignore
the positive share price effects of the greenmailers' initial purchases, in 44% of the
cases studied the payment of greenmail alone was associated with a positive change
in shareholder return. Thus, banning greenmail payments would result in a diminu-
tion of shareholder wealth for many, perhaps most, firms.
The only study of the greenmail process concluding that greenmail is harmful
to shareholders was the Jarrell and Ryngaert study. Their study is methodologically
flawed in ways the other three studies were not. Consistent with the other studies,
Jarrell and Ryngaert found that the initial purchases by the greenmailer caused a
9.7 % increase in the share price of the target firm. Like the other studies, Jarrell
and Ryngaert found that when the greenmail was actually paid, the decline in share
price of 5.2% was smaller than the initial increase. However, unlike the other
studies, Jarrell and Ryngaert conclude that greenmail leaves repurchasing firms
worse off because of events in the "interim period" between the time of the initial
purchase and the time of the greenmail payment.5 The average interim period in
the Jarrell and Ryngaert study was 280 trading days-well over a full year. Serious
methodological problems arise in extending the study period for this length of time.
In particular, it seems clear that study results were clouded by other events entirely
unrelated to the initial purchase and greenmail payments themselves, because the
distortion to empirical results created by random noise increases with the length of
the period being treated as a single event.
For purposes of this discussion, the critical point is that the empirical studies
report only averages. Greenmail benefitted shareholders in some firms and harmed
shareholders in others. It is simply not possible for regulators to determine which
firms would benefit from paying greenmail and which would be harmed by such
payments. Moreover, for any target firm, it might make sense to pay greenmail in
some circumstances, and to decline to pay in others. Only an enabling approach to
corporate law allows this kind of flexibility. Consistent with this theory, it is instruc-
tive that many firms have enacted charter provisions specifically banning
management and directors from paying greenmail, while other firms continue to
permit the practice. This is an example of the enabling process at work.
Another example of the enabling process at work involves the decision by many
state legislatures, including Delaware, to permit corporate boards of directors to
"opt-out" of personal liability for directors for violations of the fiduciary duty of
care. The justification for making legal liability provisions enabling rather than
mandatory stems from the fact that the prospect of legal liability for corporate
officers and directors has costs as well as benefits for corporate shareholders. Legal
liability benefits shareholders to the extent that the potential for legal liability forces
managers and directors to work harder to maximize value for shareholders.
Legal liability imposes costs on shareholders for a variety of reasons. First, the
58. Id. at 45 n.107.
59. Id. at 45.
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potential for legal liability may make managers and directors too risk averse. This
risk aversion can deter corporations from making profitable investments because
managers and directors are concerned that if the investments turn out badly, they
will be subjected to personal liability. As Ralph Winter, a prominent federal judge
and former Yale Law School Professor has observed:
[P]otential profit often corresponds to the potential risk, it is very much
in the interest of shareholders that the law not create incentives for
overly cautious corporate decisions. Some opportunities offer great profits
at the risk of very substantial losses, while the alternatives offer less risk
of loss but also less potential profit. Shareholders can reduce the vola-
tility of risk by diversifying their holdings. In the case of the diversified
shareholder, the seemingly more risky alternatives may well be the best
choice since great losses in some stocks will over time be offset by even
greater gains in others.
60
Another cost of open-ended personal liability for managers and directors for
negligence is that it imposes needless administrative costs on the corporations.
Administrative costs arise because officers and directors are concerned about share-
holder lawsuits. They attempt to insulate themselves from personal liability by
hiring lawyers and investment bankers whenever important corporate decisions are
being made to create a paper record that provides a contemporaneous justification
for their decisions.
Finally, rational shareholders might elect to abandon their right to bring suits
against directors for negligent acts, because of the costs imposed by imperfections in
the litigation process. First, the litigation process is widely understood to be:
[A] most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business decisions. The
circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not easily recon-
structed in a courtroom years later, since business imperatives often call
for quick decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect information.
The entrepreneur's function is to encounter risks and to confront uncer-
tainty, and a reasoned decision at the time made may seem a wild hunch
viewed years later against a background of perfect knowledge."'
A second reason for doubting the efficacy of the litigation process is that the
widely disbursed shareholders in a public corporation have no incentive to incur the
high costs of bringing a lawsuit against the directors of the firms in which they own
shares. Usually the costs of bringing the lawsuit are greatly in excess of any indi-
vidual shareholder's pro-rata share of the gains. The legal system has responded to
this difficulty by permitting class-action and derivative lawsuits to be brought
against corporate directors. These lawsuits substitute lawyers for shareholders as the
real parties in interest in the suit.
Unfortunately, solving the collective action problem among shareholders often
60. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982).
61. Id.
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creates an even greater problem. Costly litigation may be brought against corporate
directors not because of the benefits to the corporation of bringing such litigation,
but rather because of the attorneys' counsel fees involved in negotiating a settle-
ment. Firms settle even non-meritorious lawsuits when the costs of continuing the
litigation are greater than the costs of settlement. Thus, rational shareholders will
often conclude that the savings associated with "opting-out" of this costly litigation
process greatly exceed the costs of denying themselves the rights afforded by the
system.
V. CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion has provided an exposition of the perspectives to be
gained from an economic approach to corporate law. The point of this discussion has
been to show that investors, capital markets, and society generally will be better off
if policymakers take an enabling approach to corporate law. Under this approach,
the corporate form can continue to serve its traditional role as a remarkably
powerful device for financing complex, capital-intensive business ventures in
advanced societies that enjoy reasonably broad distributions of wealth. An enabling
regime of corporate law provides a useful set of off-the-rack rules so that partici-
pants in corporate ventures can economize on contracting costs. The ability of an
enabling system of corporate law to deal with change gives such systems distinct
advantages over rigid, mandatory rules. This flexibility is particularly important in
canon law countries, where legal change is less frequent, than in common law coun-
tries, where legal change occurs with every judicial decision.
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